7 Questions about 9/11
for Anthony Summers and Robbyn Swan
authors of The Eleventh Day: The Full Story of 9/11 and Osama bin Laden

On July 19th of this year, Ballantine Books published The Eleventh Day, the first comprehensive account of the history and legacy of September 11th, 2001. Having spent five years researching the book, Summers and Swan speak with their editor, Mark Tavani, about the project.

MARK TAVANI: You are—together or separately—the authors of a number of ambitious books, definitive works on topics as important as Richard Nixon, J. Edgar Hoover, the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, and the fall of the Romanov dynasty. Even so, this effort stands out as a massive undertaking. What ultimately compelled you to accept the challenge of writing a history of 9/11? In the end, was it a larger task than you had imagined?

ANTHONY SUMMERS & ROBBYN SWAN: That’s an understatement. It may seem to have been foolhardy on our part, five long years ago, to take on a full-scale probe into the events of September 11. Like so many projects that mushroom, however, we did at first intend quite that and what we did plan did not seem so daunting a challenge. We began in the realization that millions of people—not just the loonier conspiracy theorists—had questions about events on the day of 9/11, and we hoped to offer some answers. Before we knew it, though, we realized we had entered a universe of facts and factoids that cried out for resolution. These past five years, all other personal goals and opportunities have been blocked by “when the book is finished” moments. One of our children asked recently, “When will we be a family again?” He was joking, we hope.

A colleague suggested recently that it may be futile to wrestle a book like The Eleventh Day into existence for a readership becoming weary, or that—fed with instant news and instant “history” streaming off the Internet and the TV news channels – shrug, “We all know what happened.” We figured, though, that the tracer-fire of cascading information with which people have to contend makes it that much more essential to offer a book in which—on this tenth anniversary—people can truly place their trust. We believe The Eleventh Day stands as the first comprehensive, independent, documented record of the seismic world event that began this 21st century.

The mythologizing of 9/11, we quickly learned, began as early as the afternoon of the attacks when a television viewer posted a message to a chat room suggesting that the Twin Towers’ collapse looked like a “controlled demolition” job. It was the first suggestion that the towers had been brought down by something other than the impact of the airliners and the inferno that ensued, the first hint of some sinister “inside job”—and bizarre notions began to sprout. When the Bush administration resisted holding an inquiry, the dark doubts spread. By the time two reports had been published, America had long been mired in two controversial foreign wars and the facts about 9/11 had become politicized—around the world. Later, as our labors proved prolonged, the tenth anniversary came to seem the moment for a gripping narrative of the event, what led up to it, the people at the heart of it—and a swipe at the myths, the rumors and the untruths.

MT: The book’s chilling first section focuses on the events of the morning of 9/11 itself. How difficult was it to write about? Did the two of you have any specific experience with that morning that came to mind as you constructed these chapters?

AS & RS: For the moment by moment scenes aboard the flights we relied in The Eleventh Day first on the hard facts—shorn as they mostly are of emotion—the wealth of audiotape and transcripts that the 9/11 Commission obtained and preserved. Interwoven with our own research on the personalities of the victims and the nineteen young hijackers, the assembled material brought the bravery of some individuals into focus for the first time. It’s long been known that flight attendant Betty Ong on American Flight 11 alerted colleagues on the ground to the hijacking. Less familiar is the fact that she had the presence of mind to pinpoint where each hijacker was seated on American 11, which made it possible to identify the terrorists at once. Danny Lewin, co-founder of Akamai Technologies in Boston, was probably the first person to die that day, very possibly because—as a former member of an elite Israeli commando unit—he spoke Arabic, gathered swiftly what was afoot, and rose to intervene. Little known, as well, is the fact that passengers on Flight 175—like their more storied counterparts on United 93—may have tried to fight back. Passenger Brian Sweeney, a former Navy pilot who’d taught at the Top Gun fighter weapons school, briefly got through on the phone to his mother to say, “I might have to hang up quickly, we’re going to try to do something about this.”

One of the most rewarding parts of our task was to write the story of the firefighters, the police, and the EMTs—the first responders. We were able to draw on the more than 500 interviews conducted by a New York City Fire Department task force after 9/11. What the firefighters recalled helped clarify issues that still loom large for the “truther” community—like the supposedly mysterious collapse of World Trade Center 7—suspected by some to have been tumbled by explosives planted in advance. In fact, senior fire officials on the scene foresaw and prepared for the collapse in the early afternoon of 9/11—when they saw how seriously the building had been compromised by great chunks falling from the Twin Towers. The interviews also revealed with brutal clarity how the issue of “jumpers”—those who fell or chose to jump from the towers—affected not only operations but first responders’ most shattering memories. The first firemen killed on 9/11, Daniel Suhr, died after he had been struck by a plummeting office worker. Trying both to convey the horror and retain sensitivity meant that those passages of the book were written and rewritten many times.

MT: By September 12th this year, perhaps, most Americans will wish to put 9/11 out of their minds—at least for another 365 days. A growing number of people, however, cannot do that. An overwhelmingly sad aspect of the 9/11 saga—sad because it is invisible and easily ignored—is that thousands of rescuers and civilians who were near the Towers that day and in the weeks that followed now suffer serious health problems. Many have already died. Could this have been largely avoided? Where does responsibility lie?

AS & RS: The destruction of the World Trade Center, in the heart of the financial district, seriously damaged other buildings in the area and forced the markets to close. At a National Security Council meeting only twelve hours after the attacks, counterterrorism coordinator Richard Clarke has written, Bush said, “I want the economy back, open for business right away, banks, the stock market, everything—tomorrow.” Environmental Protection Agency press releases subsequently reassured New Yorkers that their air was safe to breathe. A report by the EPA’s Inspector General later found, though, that the EPA’s press releases were “influenced” by the White House. The EPA official responsible for them told the Inspector General that she “felt extreme pressure” from her White House contact—to the extent that in at least one instance “I did not feel like it was my press release.”

We now know that some New Yorkers expressed concern about what they might be breathing almost immediately. Even as the South Tower collapsed, an emergency operator took a call from a woman worried about “the respiratory effect of these particles.” In retrospect, prescient indeed. More than 600 first responders had by last year died from illnesses believed to be attributable to their work on 9/11. The James Zadroga 9/11 Health and Compensation Act, named for a policeman who died, is intended to provide for the long term health needs of those affected. More work needs to be done. An initial review has ruled that cancer may not be included in the list of illnesses covered by the new law. Captain Al Hagan, the president of Uniformed Fire Officers’ Association of New York, tells us that the union believes there is a link between the toxins ejected at 9/11 and cancers now suffered. A study by the FDNY’s chief medical officer Dr. David Prezant, published by The Lancet, provides the required evidence. The union, he says, hopes Prezant’s study will suffice to get cancer included on the list of illnesses covered by the Zadroga bill. Hagan feels passionately that failing adequately to care for all sick 9/11 first responders is tantamount to “leaving your wounded on the battlefield.” He’s right.

MT: The Eleventh Day uncovers not only the chaos of the day but the mistakes made, and exposes the untruths told after the fact—at the highest level of government. But who emerge with credit from the failed attempt to defend America?

AS & RS: The coordination of America’s military response that morning was far from perfect. In the words of one flight controller involved, “We were always a day late and a dollar short. We just could never catch up.” The longest notification U.S. air defense forces had that an airplane had been hijacked was a mere eight minutes. That was when Boston traffic controllers worked through and around regulations, after the seizure of the first plane, American 11, to reach the military rapidly. The military learned of the seizure of Flight 175 only as it crashed into the South Tower. They heard that American 77 was missing only three minutes before it crashed into the Pentagon. As for Flight 93, information that it had been hijacked came through only four minutes after it had crashed.

Such shortfalls were for the most part not the fault of the military commanders, pilots, or air traffic controllers at the operational level. They struggled admirably with an unprecedented and utterly unforeseen series of events. We’d single out especially the regional air traffic control centers at Boston and New York. Their staff began to divert or ground flights in their areas before a nationwide ground stop was ordered. The nationwide stop appears to have been the result of a collective decision made at the FAA’s Herndon Command Center. Ben Sliney, on his first day as national operations manager, brought 4500 planes safely back to the ground. We’d also nominate Cleveland controller John Werth. Werth, who was working Flight 93, determined early on that the flight had been hijacked. He at once informed his superiors and himself requested military assistance almost half-an-hour before the plane crashed in Pennsylvania. At FAA headquarters, lamentably, Werth’s pleas met with inertia. On one newly released tape, told it was urgent that a decision be made on scrambling the military, the headquarters staffer taking the call is heard responding, “Uh, you know, everybody just left the room.”

MT: Much of what has been written about the hijackers indicates or implies that they were no more than bloodthirsty religious zealots motivated only by the fanatical Osama bin Laden. You looked into this and spoke to people with intimate knowledge of the men. Does that impression jive with what you found?

AS & RS: We thought it essential to develop the hijackers’ story—to go beyond the crude profiles they have been given in most coverage and 9/11 literature. Anthony, who speaks German, spent a good deal of time delving into the future terrorists’ lives in Germany, where three of the four hijack pilots lived for years before moving to the U.S. We also consulted two scholars who have done a thought-provoking translation and analysis of the hijackers’ “spiritual manual”—three copies of which were recovered after the attacks (in Mohammed Atta’s luggage, in another hijacker’s car, and at the crash site of Flight 93). The manual, along with the fresh interviews and documents we obtained, convinced us that the prime motive—for the three German-based hijackers certainly—was the Palestine-Israel issue. Motive, of course, is central to any criminal investigation. The Palestine factor, however, was sensitive ground for the 9/11 Commission. In their memoir on the Commission’s work, co-chairmen Tom Kean and Lee Hamilton wrote: “Commissioners who argued that al Qaeda was motivated primarily by a religious ideology—and not by opposition to American policies—rejected mentioning the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the Report. In their view, listing U.S. support for Israel as a root cause of al Qaeda’s opposition to the United States indicated that the United States should reassess that policy.” Lee Hamilton himself, for his part, took the view that, if shown to be accurate, this factor was essential to a full understanding of the event. We agree.

MT: Bin Laden was killed as this book was being finished. Having researched and ruminated on 9/11 and related events for so many years, what were your thoughts in the moments after learning of his death? Do you think the world is safer now that he is gone?

AS & RS: For us, the news was startling in a special way. Having finally completed checks of the galley proof of The Eleventh Day in the early hours, European-time—we’re based in Ireland—we were woken at 6:30a.m. by a colleague texting us news of the Navy Seals’ exploit at Abbotabad. It meant we had to go back to the coal-face, after years of eight-day weeks, turn fresh research ground and write a new chapter. Like many of those who had studied bin Laden, we had come to doubt that—were he to be tracked down—he would be found in some cave in the mountains of Afghanistan. And there was a skein of evidence suggesting that Pakistan’s intelligence service—the ISI—had after 9/11 remained either in touch with bin Laden or at any rate aware of his location. The former U.S. special envoy to the Afghan resistance, Peter Tomsen, told the 9/11 Commission that ISI officials were still visiting bin Laden as late as December 2001 and continued thereafter to know where he was. There was concern, given the complexity of the political landscape in Pakistan, that strong links between the ISI and al Qaeda had persisted. A member of a Pakistani delegation that visited the White House late in the Bush presidency, indeed, recalled the American position at that time as being “very hot on the ISI”. Bush, he said, had jibed, “When we share information with you guys, the bad guys always run away.” That sentiment was shared within the Obama administration. CIA Director Leon Panetta, speaking after the killing of bin Laden, justified the fact that Pakistan had received no advance notice of the strike deep inside their country. “It was decided,” Panetta said, “that any effort to work with the Pakistanis could jeopardize the mission. They might alert the targets.” Looked at in historical context, as we do in The Eleventh Day, it’s no surprise that the “get bin Laden” operation was very closely held and was executed as a bolt from the blue for the government of Pakistan, thus for all who may have been aware of his presence. And, literally, for bin Laden himself.

Whether or not the world is “safer” depends on: 1) the extent to which bin Laden himself at the time of his death still had real influence in al Qaeda or in the wider jihadi community, and 2) the extent which his brand of Islamic terrorism remains a potent global threat. Some had suggested that bin Laden’s role had become more inspiration for militant Islam than functioning part of al Qaeda’s command structure. Recent reports suggest that may not have been so, that communications retrieved from the computers in the Abbottobad compound show he remained in close touch with his deputies, actively planning and keen to mount another attack – only concerned that it outdo even the enormity of 9/11. If so, bin Laden’s death had practical as well as symbolic significance, as did the death in late August in a drone attack of al Qaeda’s reputed operations chief Atiyah abd al-Rahman.

As to al Qaeda itself, its core seems to be a dwindling group of those who were close to bin Laden, now led by sixty-year-old Ayman al-Zawahiri. The leadership may now be increasingly irrelevant to the jihadi organizations and the disparate political agendas that have been loosely associated with al Qaeda. It is far from clear, though, that bin Laden’s brand of Islamic radicalism has lost its potency. Overt al Qaeda influence has not been apparent during the uprisings still roiling the Middle East and North Africa. Yet, as this interview is being conducted, it emerges that the top rebel commander who led the assault on the Libyan capital in August once fought alongside the Taliban. The CIA had interrogated him as an Islamist terror suspect (which may or may not signify much). Where there is a power vacuum, or where popular uprising fails to deliver change, al Qaeda or its heirs will seek ways to exert influence.

MT: Were you suddenly to be offered solutions to some of the outstanding puzzles about 9/11, which would you choose? And why?

AS & RS: We’d propose the release of two pieces of the jigsaw. It is in the power of President Obama to deliver them to the American people. First, we’d like to see the release of the 28-page final section of Congress’ Joint Inquiry Report, withheld at the personal insistence of former President Bush – over the protests of both the Democratic and the Republican co-chairs of the Inquiry, backed by more than forty U.S. senators. The section deals with what its heading describes as “information suggesting specific sources of foreign support for some of the 9/11 hijackers while they were in the United States.” Insiders who saw the suppressed pages say they relate to “very direct links” with Saudi Arabian officials that “cannot be passed off as rogue, isolated or coincidental.” The investigations had reportedly drawn “connections between high-level Saudi princes and associates of the hijackers.” Possible state sponsorship of the attacks is a central issue that was not fully resolved in the published portions of either official investigation. Anything that contributes to resolving that issue, if not damaging to national security—and the Report’s eminent co-chairs said the 28 pages do not do that—should be released. To withhold the pages is an insult to the American public.

We’d also want to see the release of the CIA Inspector General’s report on the Agency’s “accountability with respect to the 9/11 attacks.” The report deals extensively with the CIA’s handling of intelligence about Nawaf al Hazmi and Khalid al Mihdhar, the first two hijackers to arrive in the United States. The CIA has maintained that, in spite of the fact that they had arranged surveillance of the two men before they arrived—and knew they had valid visas to enter the United states—they simply “lost them,” never entered their names on the State Department Watchlist, and failed to advise the FBI about those telltale U.S. entry visas until the summer of 2001. Why? By mistake, the CIA has claimed. Others suspect a different truth, involving a CIA secret that it chose to conceal.

Meanwhile, the Agency has released only a brief executive summary of the full Inspector General’s Report. The summary questioned the performance of various CIA officers and recommended that the work of named officers—including former Director George Tenet—be reviewed by an Accountability Review Board. Tenet’s successor Porter Goss declined to hold such a review and described the men involved as “among the finest” the Agency had. That these “fine” officers should make a list of egregious mistakes without being held accountable contributes to the suspicion that we have not been told the full truth about 9/11. Release of the full Report could perhaps put an end to a salient part of the lingering doubt.

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ANTHONY SUMMERS is the author of seven bestselling nonfiction books. After leaving Oxford University, he worked in television, becoming a senior journalist for the BBC’s flagship current-affairs program. He covered the United States, the Middle East, and the Vietnam War. His previous books have included biographies of President Richard Nixon and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover.

ROBBYN SWAN, Summers’s co-author and wife, graduated from Smith college. They have been partners on three books, have contributed to Vanity Fair, and have been consultants on documentaries for PBS, the History Channel, CNN, and the BBC.
(Photo credit: Eileen Hyland)

MARK TAVANI is an Executive Editor with Ballantine Books at the Random House Publishing Group. He works with bestselling and award-winning authors such as Justin Cronin, George Dohrmann, and Bill Simmons, among others. (Photo credit: Adrian Kinloch)